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Substituting  for  G" from  (3)  and  utilizing  the  adding-up  restrictions, 
-uuB,  = uLK8,  + u,e,  and  -uKKeK  = a,,€),  + u,e,,  (A2) becomes 
(A3)  i"  =  -ay,[uL;((l  - 0;)  + ufIO,"]p,  + [u&(1 - 0;)  + oj$~;]i-" 
+ e;(u,;  - u;,)g"  . 
In  the  case  where  the  production  function  is  separable  between  primary 
factors and imported inputs, u,  = u,,  = uvI and (A3) simplifies to 
('44)  jn  = [~:~(i  - e;)  + ~;,e;](i~  - aynFj~). 
From equations (2) and (3): 
Substituting this expression into (A4) gives equation (13) in the text 
('45)  jn  = u,Pn - adg"  , 
where 
al = [i - ay,(i -  e;)][~:~(i  - e;)  + ~;~e;]/e; 
u2 = e;[u:K(i  - e;)  + ~;,e,"]/e; . 
The expression for I"  stated in (14) is obtained by the same procedure. 
7  Fiscal and Monetary Policy, 
Financial Intermediation, 
Inflation, and Growth 
In  previous  chapters  I  have  often  emphasized  the  self-reinforcing  and 
stagflationary  nature  of  the  various  macroeconomic  mechanisms  linking 
large  fiscal  deficits,  high  inflation,  financial  disintermediation,  and  slow 
growth. At present, Mexico, like so many other Latin American countries, 
seems to be trapped in a self-perpetuating  spiral of this sort: high inflation 
provokes a flight of funds from the banking system; the low level of financial 
intermediation  curtails the supply of  bank  loans  for productive investment 487  MexicoIChapter I 
and exacerbates short-run inflationary pressures by reducing the demand for 
the monetary base; as low investment rates translate into slower growth in 
productive capacity, a new wave of financial intermediation takes place, tax 
revenue declines, the fiscal deficit increases, and the cycle begins anew but 
at  a  higher  rate  of  inflation  than  before.  The  Mexican  government  has 
attempted to break out of this destabilizing spiral by cutting fiscal spending, 
by  setting high marginal reserve ratios (nearly 100 percent) to increase the 
demand for the monetary base, and by  financing a greater proportion of  the 
fiscal deficit through bond sales. This approach has clearly not worked well, 
and a large number of unresolved policy issues remain. Is it better to reduce 
the deficit by raising taxes or cutting expenditures? Will higher reserve ratios 
and regulations requiring banks to purchase more government bonds reduce 
the inflation rate and lower bond rates or, perversely, will they lead to greater 
financial disintermediation, capital decumulation,  and  higher inflation  and 
larger  fiscal  deficits  as  the  tax  base  shrinks?  Similarly,  will  reduced 
monetization of  the deficit  lower the inflation rate,  as claimed by  simple 
monetarist models; or, instead, will the inflation rate increase either because 
interest payments on the government debt increase sharply or because higher 
bond rates strongly crowd out private investment, lowering future output and 
tax revenues? 
The aim of this chapter is to gain a deeper understanding of  these policy 
issues by developing a model that captures various key elements making up 
the fiscal deficit-financial  intermediation-growth-inflation  nexus. In section 
7.1 I  develop the  basic  model,  while in  sections 7.2-7.7  I  analyze the 
consequences of  different policy packages designed to service the external 
debt. The results are used in the  final section to evaluate the stabilization 
program followed by  the De La Madrid administration. 
7.1  The Model 
The  standard analysis  of  inflation  and  fiscal  deficits follows the  early 
work  of  Cagan  (1956)  and  Mundell  (1965)  and  is  based  on  a  minimal 
model  in  which real  output is exogenous and high-powered money  is the 
sole financial asset in the economy. This framework might be adequate for 
analysis of  hyperinflation, but it is too simple to yield any insight about the 
difficulties facing  the  Mexican  economy,  an  economy  that  is  stumbling 
deeper into stagflation but has not yet  reached the dysfunctional point  of 
hyperinflation. 
In what follows, a fairly rich model is developed that allows for inside and 
outside money,  interest-bearing government debt,  and  endogenous capital 
accumulation. Due to the detailed specification of  the financial sector, the 
dynamics for wealth accumulation are analytically intractable. The analysis, 
therefore, will be confined to a comparison of steady-state outcomes. This is 
an acknowledged shortcoming. Comparative steady-state analysis, however, 488  Edward F.  Buffie 
is one important element in judging the adequacy of different policy packages 
in that it defines the long-run economic tradeoffs that will ultimately have to 
be confronted. Such comparisons enable one to judge whether a stabilization 
program  is inherently  sound or instead  a  "quick  fix"  that will  eventually 
create  more  severe  macroeconomic  problems.  The  central  thesis  of  this 
chapter is that many of the recent Mexican stabilization measures have been 
of the quick-fix variety. 
The  model  is  laid  out  in  stages,  beginning  with  the  goods  and  labor 
markets. 
7.1.1  Aggregate Supply and the Labor Market 
The economy  is  small  and  completely  open, producing  one importable 
manufactured  good  and two agricultural  export goods. There are no trade 
taxes and the world market price of each good is fixed at unity. Consequently, 
all domestic prices  are set by  the exchange rate and all relative prices also 
equal unity (choose any good as the numeraire). Capital and labor are used in 
production of the manufactured good, and land and labor in production of the 
agricultural  goods.  Technology  exhibits  constant  returns  to  scale  in  each 
sector, and the aggregate  supplies of  land  and labor are perfectly  inelastic. 
Land is intersectorally mobile. 
As  in the model of  the preceding chapter, the labor market is dualistic. A 
rigid  real  wage,  wm, prevails  in  the  manufacturing  sector  while  a lower, 
market-clearing real wage, wx,  is paid in the two agricultural sectors. Besides 
the  private  manufacturing  sector,  the  public  sector  pays  a  relatively  high 
wage.  Parastatal  firms employ Ng  workers at a fixed real  wage, wg  > wx. 
Both Ng  and wg  are treated as government policy variables. The public sector 
capital stock is fixed, so parastatal output, Qg,  varies only with Ng: 
(1)  Qg  = F(Lg),  F'  > 0. 
This specification for the real side of the economy implies that all real factor 
prices are constant as long as relative goods prices are constant.'  Since real 
factor prices are fixed, employment  in the high-wage manufacturing sector, 
N",  varies proportionately  with the capital stock, K: 
(2)  dN"  = edK, 
where 4  = N"/K, the (constant) labor-capital ratio.' 
Using  standard methods from duality theory,  it is easy to verify  that the 
value  of  private  sector  income,  Yp, and  total  wage  income,  Y",  may  be 
represented by functions of the form 
(3) 
(4) 
Yp = Yp(K,  Ng, wg) 489  Mexico/Chapter 7 
where 
Y:, = rK +  (wm -  wx)e,  Y; =  (Wm -  wx)e, 
y$ = yy = wg -  wx, 
Ng  ,  yp - yy  =  3- 
and rK is the competitive capital rental. When the capital stock rises, output 
increases directly by the amount r, and indirectly by (wm  - wx)  e as labor 
is  reallocated  from  the  low-wage  agricultural  sectors  to  the  high-wage 
manufacturing  sector.  Similarly,  an  increase  in  public  sector  employment 
raises private income by the extent of the sectoral wage gap, wg  - wx. 
The main reason for postulating this particular productive structure is that 
it  permits  a  simple  and  clear  delineation  of  a  key  general  equilibrium 
relation,  namely,  the interdependence  of capital accumulation  and financial 
intermediation. An increase in the capital stock raises total wage income by 
expanding  employment in  the  high-wage  manufacturing  sector.  In  general 
equilibrium,  this  triggers  a mutually  reinforcing,  virtuous cycle  of  capital 
accumulation and financial deepening: as workers increase their holdings of 
demand  deposits,  banks  extend more loans, which  leads to further capital 
accumulation,  further growth  in  wage  income  and  bank  lending,  etc. The 
same feedback  mechanism  operates  and  broadly  similar qualitative  results 
emerge in any model in which capital accumulation increases labor income 
(for example, in models with integrated labor markets where a rise in K bids 
up the market-clearing wage). 
7.1.2  The Banking System 
The government  owns  and  regulates  all  banks.  Bank  interest  rates  are 
administratively determined  and are set below  their market-clearing  levels. 
From the funds supplied by the public  at the regulated  deposit rate,  banks 
either purchase government bonds or make loans to private sector firms. As 
the real  loan rate is too low to clear the market,  loan demand is rati~ned.~ 
Furthermore, in keeping  with regulations  that require banks to apportion  a 
sizable fraction of their investible funds to the purchase of various government 
financial assets, the division of the bank portfolio between capital and bonds 
is  treated  as  exogenous. Banks  face a  reserve  requirement,  k,  and  must 
channel the fraction kb of their deposits, D,  into bond purchases. Captive bank 
bond demand, Bb, is thus 
(5)  Bb = kbD 
and (assuming excess reserves  are zero) the quantity  of  loans, L, is deter- 
mined residually as 
(6)  L  = xD. 490  Edward F.  Buffie 
wherex  1 -  k -  kb. 
Though  the  “commercial”  banks  in  Mexico  are  managed  by  and 
classified as part of  the private sector, clearly their losses (or, improbably, 
their profits) must be absorbed by the public sector budget. It is useful at this 
juncture,  therefore, to note from (5) and (6) that real bank profits, Z, are 
given by 
(7)  z  = (TLX  -k  rbkb -  rd -  mk]D, 
where m represents the inflation rate and r,,  rb, and r, denote, respectively, 
the real loan rate, the real bond rate, and the real deposit rate. 
7.1.3  Capital Accumulation and Private Sector Asset Demands 
Any model of the financial sector in Mexico should faithfully reflect certain 
important  stylized  facts  concerning  asymmetries  in  the  pattern  of  asset 
holdings across  agents.  First,  whereas  cash  (or  currency) accounts for  a 
negligible fraction of total wealth of high-income groups, the poor hold virtu- 
ally  all of  their  wealth  in  the  form  of  money  broadly  defined  (currency 
+ demand  deposit^).^ Second, even among those who are relatively well off, 
few have the opportunity to invest in capital assets due to the absence of an 
extensive and well-functioning equities market. 
With these stylized facts in mind, I assume the specialized pattern of asset 
holdings  described  in  table  7.1  .5  This  particular  configuration of  asset 
holdings can be plausibly explained by  a mixture of institutional constraints 
and  different patterns  of  asset  dominance.  Capital  dominates bonds,  but 
neither landowners nor workers can acquire capital as they are not directly 
involved  in  organization of  the  productive process  in  the  manufacturing 
sector. In  addition,  workers do not  hold  bonds because either  their time 
preference rate is too high or large fixed transactions costs render small bond 
purchases unprofitable. Bonds are an important saving instrument only for 
the landowners, who may be thought of in the current model as proxying for 
the  upper  middle  class.  And  finally,  while  both  currency  and  demand 
deposits  serve  as  mediums  of  exchange  and  hence  enter  agents’  utility 
functions, the transactions needs of  family  firms and landowners are such 
that,  for these two agents,  demand deposits dominate currency. The main 
consequence of  this latter assumption is that when the government pegs the 
Table 7.1  The Pattern of Asset Holdings 
Agent  Assets  Liabilities 
Family firms  capital, demand deposits  bank loans 
Landownen  bonds, demand deposits  none 
Workers  demand deposits, currency  none 491  MexicoKhapter 7 
real deposit and real loan rates, workers alone shoulder the burden of  the 
inflation tax. 
Private sector asset demands are obtained by  solving a set of  explicitly 
specified intertemporal optimization problems. Each agent is infinitely lived 
and has a recursive utility functional of the type formulated by Uzawa (1968). 
This class of utility functionals has the desirable property of allowing local 
time preference to vary continuously as a function of current utility (Epstein 
and Hynes 1983; Epstein 1987). In steady-state equilibrium, utility remains at 
the  level  u*  and  the  time  preference  rate  becomes  the  constant  p(u*). 
Following the usual practice in the literature, I assume 
(8)  (i) p' > 0 and (ii) p - p'u > 0. 
The first condition reflects the notion of  increasing marginal impatience, to 
use the terminology of  Lucas and Stokey (1984). The second implies that 
in a comparison of  two stationary consumption streams, the stream having 
higher  instantaneous  utility  confers  higher  total  utility  and  will  be 
preferred. 
Succeeding  sections  are  devoted  to  characterizing the  nature  of  each 
agent's  asset  demands.  The  discussion  in  the  text  is  largely  informal. 
Derivations of  the  asset  demands may  be  found in  the  appendix to  this 
chapter. Notational conventions are as follows: all variables are expressed in 
real  terms,  and  c, v, and  w  superscripts refer,  respectively,  to  capitalist 
family firms, landowners, and  workers; common, unsuperscripted symbols 
are  used  for  the  utility  function  and  the  time  preference  rate,  but  it  is 
understood that these differ across agents. 
Family Firms 
The family firm holds its (gross) wealth in the form of two assets, physical 
capital and demand deposits. Deposits, unlike bonds, are not dominated by 
capital because they yield nonpecuniary services in facilitating transactions. 
These nonpecuniary services are indirectly accounted for by  incorporating 
real deposits into the utility function. Current utility, u,  is represented by the 
indirect utility function 
u  = V(E', Dc), 
where 
VE,  VD > 0,  VDE = VED > 0, VEE,  VDD  0 
and  E'  is real  consumption expenditure and  D'  is real  demand deposits. 
Increases in E'  and D'  raise utility but at a diminishing rate.6 V has positive 
cross partial derivatives, indicating that a higher level of  real consumption 
raises the marginal utility of deposits. 492  Edward F.  Buffie 
Investment  in  physical  capital  and accumulation  of  real  deposits  are fi- 
nanced out of  retained profits and bank loans, L. Since the firm is rationed in 
in its access to bank loans, retained profits are the marginal source of invest- 
ment  funds  and  time  preference  affects  steady-state  asset  demands.  In  a 
stationary equilibrium where K,  E", Dc, and L are all constant, 
(9)  +~(1  -  7)  = p{V[+(K)(l -  7)  f rdDc -  rLL, o']} 
+(K) is  the  restricted  profit  function  with  the  constant  wm  suppressed. 
+,,  the return  on capital, equals the  competitive  capital  rental,  r,.  T is a 
flat  ad  valorem  tax  that  applies  to  all  noninterest  income  (gross  profits, 
wages,  and land rents).  In  the  present  model,  7  is  equivalent  to a value- 
added tax. 
Equations  (9) and  (10)  state that  capital  will  be  accumulated  until  its 
return  equals the  time  preference  rate and  that  the  marginal  rate  of  sub- 
stitution  between  consumption  and  dcposits  will  be  equated  to  the  op- 
portunity  cost  of  deposits, +,(1  - 7) - r,.  Solving these  two equations 
for K  and Dc gives 
(12)  Dc = hC(7), 
where 
Under constant returns to scale, the return on capital is constant for a given 
value of wm.  As the return on capital does not vary across steady states, the 
optimal long-run response to increases in L,  rd, or r, is to keep real deposit 
holdings unchanged and to adjust K until real income (inclusive of net interest 
payments)  returns  to its original  level, at  which  p  = +K(l - 7).  The ex- 
pressions for  ft ,  fi and f$  are thus quite simple: 
fi =  -D/+,(l  -  7) 
fi  = L/+,(l  -  7). 
Provided that r, is positive and L exceeds D',  we have, as noted above in (9) 
and (lo),  ft > 0 and (f: + f;)  > 0. 493  Mexico/Chapter 7 
Landowners 
The nonfirm private sector does not  receive loans and  is restricted  in  its 
asset  choices  to bonds  and  money.  For  landowners,  optimizing  behavior 
requires that asset demands satisfy 
(13)  p{v[V(l -  7)  -t rdD" f r$",  D"]} = rb 
where v stands for income from land rents.  Equations (13) and (14) yield 
(15)  B"  = f2[rb,  rd, ~(l  -  T)] 
Bonds play the same role in the landowner's  portfolio that capital does in 
the family firm's portfolio.  The real bond rate fixes the time preference rate 
so that,  in  the  long  run,  increases  in after-tax  rental  income  induce  bond 
decumulation but do not alter real deposit holdings.  Note also that there is a 
positive relation between savings and the real bond rate, as reflected  in the 
fact that steady-state wealth incrcascs with rb (f:  + h'; > 0). 
The impact of variations in real returns is largely as expected. An increase 
in  the  real  deposit  rate  induces  substitution  away  from  bonds  toward 
deposits.  A  higher  real  bond  rate, however,  may  increase  the demand  for 
both assets. Real deposit holdings rise or fall with rb depending on whether 
(17)  (a  + y)(l -  rd/rb) 3  q> 
where u = V,,E"/V,  > 0,  the elasticity of  the marginal utility  of deposits 
with  respect  to  real  consumption  expenditure;  y = -  VEEE"/VE,  the 
"partial"  Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk aversion (i.e., y is defined for 
a given value of D");  and q = (dp/dE)E/p is the elasticity of time preference 
with  respect  to real  consumption  expenditure.'  In  what  follows, I assume 
that p is strictly concave in C so that q < 1. 
A rise in rb makes it more costly to hold money in financial terms but also 
leads  to  a  higher  level  of  steady-state  consumption,  which  increases  the 
marginal utility of the nonpecuniary benefits of money relative to the marginal 
utility of goods (VDE  > 0, V,,  < 0). If q  is relatively small, a large increase 
in consumption is required to bring p up to the higher value of rb and the latter, 
positive effect is likely to dominate the former, negative effect. On the other 494  Edward F.  Buffie 
hand, when q  is relatively large, steady-state consumption rises little and the 
larger spread in financial returns causes a reduction in deposit holdings.  In 
general,  there  is  no  clear  presumption  as  to  the  sign  of  hi'.  Although 
q must be less than unity, relatively little is known about the magnitudes of 
u  and  y.  Even  if  existing  estimates  of  relative  risk  aversion  are  taken 
as  evidence  that  (a + y)  will  range  between  1 and  3, the  left  side  of 
(17) may be below unity when the initial interest rate spread is not too large. 
A feature of the asset demands that will figure importantly in future results 
is the relative magnitudes of the own- and cross-price effects. The own-price 
effect is larger than the cross-price effect for deposits, but the reverse is true 
for bonds. Overall, however, own-price effects dominate cross-price effects. 
It is readily demonstrated (see the app.) that 
Workers 
Due to a high rate of time preference and/or fixed transactions costs that 
absorb most of the return on small bond purchases,  workers allocate all of 
their wealth  to money.  Unlike capitalists and landowners, their transactions 
needs  are  such that  they  hold  significant  quantities  of  both  deposits  and 
currency, C.  The representative  worker's  indirect utility  function  is of  the 
form V(E",  D",  C) and has the properties: 
VE,  VD,  Vc,  VED, VEc > 0; VcD,  VEE, Vcc, VDD < 0; 
v,, - v,,  < 0; v,,  - v,,  < 0. 
The negative  sign for V,,  signifies  that  the two monies  are substitutes  as 
mediums of exchange. We assume as well that increases in E do not alter the 
nonpecuniary benefits of  deposits relative to those of currency: 
(18)  VC -  VD = [(O?  c), 50 > O,  [C <  O. 
Workers'  holdings of deposits and currency are determined by the condi- 
tions that 
VDIYw(l -  T)  + r,D"  - 7rC, D", C] 
(19)  v,r[Yw(l  -  7)  + rdDw - d,  D", c] 
= p{v[Y"(1 -  7)  + rdDw - TC,  D", c]}  -  rd 
The marginal nonpecuniary benefits of deposits are equated to the net price 
of  deposits, p -  rd. Currency  is accumulated  up to the  point  at which  its 
marginal  nonpecuniary  benefits  exceed  those  of  deposits  by  an  amount 
equaling the nominal deposit rate. 495  MexicoIChapter 7 
In the general solution for the asset demands, the signs of both cross-price 
terms (aclar, and aDwlan) are uncertain owing to conflicting income and 
substitution effects. Maintaining r, as the inflation rate rises, for example, 
may  not  increase deposit holdings; for while  an  increase in  the nominal 
deposit rate  induces substitution toward deposits, the  higher inflation tax 
lowers real steady-state consumption, which exerts a countervailing contrac- 
tionary effect. 
To  abstract from the ambiguous cross-price effects, I work with  special 
versions of the general solution in which the demand for each asset depends 




Dw = hw[YW(l  -  T),  id] 
c = g[Y"(l -  71,  T] 
hi", hY,  gi > 0,  g2  < 0. 
The critical implication of  neglecting cross-price effects is that to promote 
financial intermediation, the government must offer the public a higher real 
deposit rate.  Merely  pegging  the  real  deposit rate  in  the  face of  higher 
inflation will not suffice. 
7.1.4  Aggregate Asset Demands and Asset-Market Equilibrium 
The real bond rate adjusts to ensure that the stock of  outstanding bonds 
supplied by  the government is willingly held.  Combining the demand of 
banks and landowners, we have the market-clearing condition 
(23)  B  = kJl  + f2[rb,  rd.  v(1 -  711. 
The real  bond  rate  is  the  only  market-determined interest rate  in  the 
economy. All  other asset  stocks reach their long-term equilibrium values 
through quantity variation; investment by family firms and financial savings 
of the public bring K,  D, and C to their desired levels. Aggregating D",  D" 
and D'  and using (4), the general equilibrium solutions for D and C may be 
expressed as 
(24)  D  = D[Yw(K,  Ng, wg)(l -  T),  rd,  rb,  T] 
(25) 
where 
C = C[Yw(K,  Ng, wg)(l -  T),  TI, 
DI, C1, 02  > 0,  C2 < 0,  03  ,  D, S 0. 
Since workers'  holdings of  deposits increase with  their income, capital 
accumulation and financial intermediation are interdependent, mutually rein- 496  Edward F.  Buffie 
forcing processes. Growth of the capital stock raises total wage income and 
real deposits which, in turn, expands the supply of bank loans and lowers rb. 
The expansion in bank lending stimulates further capital accumulation, which 
leads  to  further  financial  deepening,  and  so  on.  To  ensure  that  capital 
accumulation, deposit accumulation, and fluctuations in the real bond rate do 
not feed back upon one another in an unstable manner, it is assumed that 
(26a)  e,, = 1  -  f{(l -  k)D,Yp(l -  T) 
= 1 - pd(e,m/e,m) 
(1 - wx/wm)rL(l  -  k)Dw/YW(l  -  T)  > 0 
where Oy  denotes the cost share of  factorj in the manufacturing sector and 
Pd stands for the elasticity of D"  with respect to after-tax wage income. The 
first restriction ensures that the capital accumulation multiplier is finite when 
the bond market does not exist (or when open-market operations peg the real 
bond rate). The second is necessary and sufficient to guarantee stability of 
the  adjustment process when  rb fluctuates to  clear the bond  market. This 
restriction requires that bonds and deposits not be overly strong substitutes. 
7.1.5  The Government Budget Constraint 
The government makes outlays for employment, consumption, internal and 
external debt service, and to cover the losses of the banking system. External 
debt service net of long-term capital inflows and concessional aid equals S in 
real terms and is treated as strictly exogenous.'  Public sector income consists 
of revenue from the value-added tax and sales of government-produced goods 
and   service^.^  Any  revenue  shortfall is covered by  printing money M or 
selling bonds: 
M + b = G  -I-  WgNg  4-  s 4-  rbB - z 
-  TYP(K,  Ng, wg) -  F(Ng) - TM, 
where an overdot signifies a time derivative. Since M and B  are constant 
in  a steady state, satisfaction of the budget constraint requires an inflation 
tax of 
(27)  mM = G  + wgNg  + S + r$  -  2 -  TYP(K,  N*, wg) -  F(Ng). 
As the asset preferences and saving behavior of the public determine only M 
and either B or r,,  there are a number of  different ways in  which budget 
balance can be achieved. For the most part, I will treat B  and  (G + S) as 497  MexicoXhapter 7 
exogenous and assume that the inflation rate is manipulated along with other 
policies (k, kb, etc.) to satisfy (27). 
While  equation  (27) is  the  standard  representation  of  the  government 
budget  constraint,  in  the  current  context  it  conceals  rather  more  than  it 
reveals.  When the government owns the banking system, net revenue from 
the  inflation  tax depends in  part on how  bank  interest rates  are managed. 
We  assume  that  the  government  pegs the  real  deposit  and  real  loan  rates 
and  treat  any  changes  in  rd  and  rL  accompanying  fluctuations  in  the 
inflation  rate  as separate, conscious  policy  decisions.  The crucial point  to 
note  is  that  under  this  interest  rate  policy,  the  net  revenue  gain  from 
raising T  is limited to just the increase in revenue from the higher inflation 
tax  on  currency  holdings;  the  higher  inflation  tax  on  bank  reserves  is 
nullified  by  greater  losses on bank  operations."  To  see this, substitute for 
Z  in (27) from (7) and decompose M into bank reserves (kD)  and currency. 
We then have 
(28)  3TC  = G  -k  s -k  WgNg -k  r$  -  [rLX  + rbkb -  rd]D 
-  rYP(K,  Ng, wg) -  F(Ng). 
The right side of  (28) shall be referred to as the adjusted fiscal deficit. 
A second important and obvious link connecting financial policy and the 
fiscal deficit  arises through  net losses incurred by the banking  system. We 
assume, generously, that the deficit on financial intermediation (Z)  is initially 
zero. This implies that initially 
(ILX + rbkb -  rd)D = TkD. 
Thus, an asymmetry exists: although higher inflation taxes only C, it remains 
true  that  growth  in bank  reserves  (kD) increases  the revenue  yield  of  the 
inflation tax.  I ' 
7.1.6  Characterizing the Steady-State Equilibrium 
D in (23) by the solution in (24) and solve for rb: 
(29) 
As a first step toward characterizing the steady-state equilibrium,  replace 
(f:  -k  kbD3)dr-b = dB -  kbDl(1 -  r)(w" - w")k'dK 
-  kbD1(l -  7)  (W'  -  Wx)dNg -  kbDI(1 -  T)N~~W' 
- (f;  -k  k@*)drd  + [f:V  + kb(D,Y" -  Dq)]d~. 
The  supply  of  deposits  effectively  determines  bank  bond  demand.  Since 
higher total wage income results in greater deposit holdings,  increases in K, 
wg,  and Ng  all lower r,. The inverse, general equilibrium relation between K 
and  rb is represented  by  the  negatively  sloped RR schedule  in  the  second 
quadrant in figure 7.1. 498  Edward F.  Buffie 
Fig. 7.1  The steady-state equilibrium 
The degree of  financial intermediation influences capital accumulation as 
well as the real bond rate. Substituting for L in (1  1) from (6) and (24) gives 
(30) 
e&K  = (ffxD2  + fi)dr, + fidr, + [f;x(D4  -  DIYw)  + f$~ 
+ f;xD1Ng(l -  T)dWg+  fixD1(Wg -  wX)(1  -  7)dh" -  fiDdk 
-  fiDdk, + f:xDgdrb  . 
Equations (29) and  (30) can be  solved simultaneously for K  and  r, as a 
function of  the policy variables r,,  r,,  k,,  k, wg,  Ng, and 7.  This enables the 
general solution for K to be written as 
(31)  K  = H(rd,  r,,  T,  k, kb,  WP,  Ng). 
With the solutions for K and r, in hand, the steady-state inflation rate can 
be pinned down through the government budget constraint. Let X = d,  the 
inflation tax on currency holdings. Making use of  (25), one obtains 
(32) 
dX  = (1 - kC)Cd.rr  + dl(l  -  T)(w"' - w")k'dK 
+ dl(1  - T)Ngdwg  + dl(1  - ~)(d  - wX)dNg  -  dlYwdT, 
where  k,  = -.rrC,/C,  the  elasticity of  currency  demand  with  respect  to 
the inflation rate.  The ZZ schedule in the fourth quadrant of  figure 7.1 is 
based  on (32) and  shows how X varies with r for given values of  K,  T, 
wg,  and Ng.  Since I am not interested in the well-known stability problems 
which arise when higher inflation lowers seignorage, pc  is restricted to be 
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Exactly where the economy locates along the ZZ  schedule depends on the 
state of the fiscal budget. Recall that revenue from the currency inflation tax 
must suffice to cover the adjusted budget deficit as given by the right side of 
(28). This provides a second relation involving X: 
(33)  dX = d(G + S) + (D -  PkDz)drd -  xDdr,  + rLDdk 
- (rb -  rL)Ddkb  + r,dB  - {w, + (wm  -  W* 
+ ~kDi(1  -  ?)]}dK -  {Yp - TICIYw + k(D1Y” -  D,)]}d? 
(B” - PkD3)drb + [Wg -  F‘ - (Wg -  W”) 
(7 + TkD,)]dW + (1 - wkD,)Ng(l -  ?)dW8 . 
Capital decumulation worsens the adjusted budget deficit both by lowering 
tax revenues and reducing real deposit holdings (which diminishes the base 
of  the overall inflation tax). The XX schedule in  the first quadrant is thus 
negatively sloped. XX is  defined for given values  of  S,  the entire set of 
policy  variables, and  r,.  Shifts of  or movements along the RR schedule 
will, therefore, produce shifts in XX. The ambiguous sign of the coefficient 
on r, is due to the fact that while a higher bond rate worsens the fiscal deficit 
by  raising  interest  payments  to  the  nonbank  public,  it  also  expands the 
monetary  base  if  bonds  and  deposits  are  complements  in  landowners’ 
portfolios (D3 > 0). As it seems clear that higher real bond rates intensify 
inflationary  pressures  in  Mexico,  I  ignore  the  opposite  possibility  by 
assuming D3 <  B”/d-that  is, bonds and deposits are not extremely strong 
complements. 
The graphical depiction of  the steady-state equilibrium is completed by 
using the reduced form solution for K in (31) to fix the position of the KK 
schedule.12 Since X = PC and the steady-state capital stock is independent 
of both C  and P when the government pegs r, and r,,  KK is horizontal. 
Associated with  a  given KK schedule are a  particular ZZ schedule in  the 
fourth  quadrant  and  a  particular equilibrium bond  rate,  which  fixes the 
position of the XX schedule. 
The intersection point of KK  and XX determines the size of the adjusted 
fiscal  deficit  and  hence  the  required  currency  inflation  tax. Once X  is 
known, the steady-state inflation rate is found by  dropping a vertical line 
to  the  ZZ  schedule.  The  corresponding mathematical  procedure  involves 
using (29) and (31) to eliminate K  and r, in (32) and (33). The resulting 
two equations can then be  solved to obtain the reduced-form solutions for 
X and P. 
7.2  Fiscal Adjustment and Debt Service 
Suppose the government is faced with increased debt service obligations 
(or a reduction in oil revenues). If  real bank interest rates (r, and rL) are 500  Edward F.  Buffie 
maintained and none of the instruments of fiscal policy (G, wg,  Ng,  and T) is 
altered,  the entire burden of adjustment falls upon the inflation  tax and we 
have  the  outcome shown  in  figure  7.1.  The shock  simply  shifts  the  XX 
schedule to the right.  Neither K  nor rb changes, and the inflation rate rises 
from T~ to  IT^. 
Apart from its ugly distributional effects-workers  alone pay the costs of 
adjustment-the  main  drawback of responding  so passively  to the external 
shock is, unsurprisingly,  that the inflation rate increases very strongly. From 
(32) and (33): 
(34) 
Under a policy of pegging real bank rates, the base for marginal increases in 
the inflation tax is very small and the shock will prove highly inflationary even 
when p.,  is well below unity. In Mexico in 1986, currency held by the public 
was just 3.1 percent of GDP (calculated using the average of  the beginning 
and  end-of-year  currency  holdings).  With  this  value  for  UGDP  and 
kb = 0.33, an increase in debt service equalling only 2.5 percent  of GDP 
implies a long-run increase in the inflation rate of  120 percentage points. 
In the foregoing I assumed that nominal bank  interest rates were actively 
adjusted  so  as to  keep real  interest  rates  fixed.  In  fact,  since  1972,  the 
Mexican  government  has  frequently  allowed  high  or  rising  inflation  to 
substantially reduce real deposit and real loan rates. By contrast, during the 
era of  Stabilizing  Development  when  single-digit  inflation  prevailed,  real 
bank interest rates were consistently positive and above U.S. rates. 
It  is not  too  difficult  to see why  policymakers  are tempted  to follow  a 
more  passive  interest  rate  policy  when  the  government  owns the  banking 
system. Note that in pegging the real deposit and loan rates, the deterioration 
in the actual budget deficit caused by the external shock is magnified by an 
increase in the deficit on financial intermediation of  Id>d.rr (see [7]). Under 
pressure to contain the growing fiscal deficit, the government may  abandon 
its  commitment  to maintain  real  bank  rates. Another  source of  temptation 
may be the hope that a lower real deposit rate will indirectly ease budgetary 
difficulties by putting downward pressure on the real bond rate and reducing 
interest payments on the internal debt. 
To  ascertain  whether  a more  passive  interest rate  policy  will help  blunt 
inflationary  pressures,  coneider the consequences  of equal decreases in the 
real  deposit  and  real  loan  rates:  dr,  = dr,  =  -dg.  (A  pure  nominal 
interest policy corresponds to -dg  =  -dn.)  Equation (33) gives 
dX =  -[Bb + kD(1 -  nD,/D)]dg 
for the direct impact on the adjusted budget deficit. Provided the semi-interest 
elasticity of deposit demand (D,/D)  is not too large, the direct impact upon the 
budget is favorable. 501  Mexico/Chapter 7 
But this is by  no means the end of the story. The steady-state capital stock 
declines: 
since (fi + f;)  < 0 and the own-price effects are larger than the cross-price 
effects (f:D2  >f2D3).I3  The  parallel decrease  in  deposit  and  loan  rates 
directly induces capital  decumulation by  raising real  income of  capitalist 
family firms, who are net debtors of the banking system. In addition, as the 
supply  of  deposits  shrinks,  bank  lending is  curtailed.  This  gives  rise  to 
further capital decumulation as reflected in the first term involving ff  . 
The decrease in the capital stock lowers real output and total wage income, 
causing tax revenues and real currency holdings to decline. Furthermore, the 
real bond rate, instead of falling together with  rd , is almost certain to rise, 
adding a third source of countervailing inflationary pressure. Substituting the 
solution for K into (29) yields 
(36) 
The  first  positive  term  captures  the  reduction  in  bank  bond  demand 
stemming  from  the  reduction  in  wage  income  and  deposit  holdings 
occasioned  by  capital  decumulation.  In  the  second  term,  the  sign  of 
(f:  + k,D,)  determines whether,  in the aggregate, bonds and deposits are 
complements or  substitutes.  A  decrease in  rd induces substitution toward 
bonds  on  the  part  of  landowners  in  the  amount f& but  banks,  finding 
themselves with  fewer funds, are forced to lower their bond  purchases by 
k&.  The latter effect is the stronger one when 
drbldg  = [bDi(fbD:! + fi f  fi) + (f,"  + bD2)(1 -  fkDi)I/ei . 
(37)  pd > -C@'/Bb  , 
where pd and ad  are, respectively, the elasticities of  total deposit demand 
and  private  sector bond  demand (i.e.,  landowners'  demand) with  respect 
to  rd.I4  The  above  condition  is  virtually  certain  to  hold;  pd , an  own- 
price  elasticity,  will  normally  exceed  (Yd a  cross-price  elasticity  and, 
in  the Mexican case, BvIBb is much smaller than unity  (B"lBb = 0.096 in 
1985). 
With the real bond rate higher and tax revenues and real currency holdings 
lower, it is not at all improbable that, after the dust settles, the inflation rate 
will increase. Figure 7.2 depicts one possible scenario. Capital decumulation 
shifts the KK schedule down to K'K' and I1 inward to 1'1'. Equation (37) is 
satisfied so that the RR schedule shifts to the left and the real bond rate rises 
from rg to rh. The increase in r, partially offsets the initial leftward shift of 
the XX schedule and, together with the decrease in tax revenues and deposit 
holdings,  produces  a  larger  adjusted  fiscal  deficit.  The  larger  deficit, 
reinforced by the reduction in real currency holdings, drives the inflation rate 
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Fig. 7.2  The effect of  equal decreases in  the real deposit and real loan rates 
7.2.1 
As figures 7.1 and 7.2 clearly demonstrate, an increase in  debt service 
creates grave macroeconomic problems when fiscal policy remains passive. 
If the government weakens in its resolve to maintain real bank interest rates, 
the economy is thrown into a cumulatively reinforcing spiral of accelerating 
inflation, rising real interest rates on the internal debt, capital decumulation, 
and financial disintermediation. This vicious cycle can be averted by pegging 
real interest rates, but the inflation rate is still certain to increase strongly. 
The  simplest  and  most  effective way  out  of  these  difficulties  is  to  cut 
government consumption expenditures by  an amount equalling the increase 
in debt service. This leaves private disposable income unchanged and keeps 
the fiscal budget in balance, thereby preserving the initial equilibrium. 
Other types of  fiscal adjustment are not  adequate substitutes for reducing 
government consumption spending. Consider first  the repercussions of cutting the 
real public sector wage. The government wage bill decreases and workers reduce 
their holdings of both currency and deposits, so the XX and IZ schedules shift 
leftward to X‘X’  and Z’Z’ in figure 7.3. From  (32) and (33) it is seen that the 
overall direct effect is deflationary under the weak assumption that15 
Tax Policy and Current Expenditure Cuts 
PA  + PdZZ < 19 
where  P,  and  Pd  are, respectively,  workers’ elasticities of  currency  and 
deposit demand with respect to after-tax wage income; z1 = .rrC/Y”( 1 -  T), 
the  currency  inflation  tax  as  a  fraction  of  after-tax  wage  income;  and 
z2 E  .rrkD”/Y”(l -  T),  the inflation tax  on  “attributed”  reserve holdings 
(kDw)  as a fraction of  after-tax wage income. 
Presumably it is this sort of partial equilibrium analysis that leads the IMF 
to tirelessly extol the  virtues of  slashing public  sector wages.  In  general 503  Mexicotchapter 7 
Fig.  7.3  The effect of  a public sector real wage cut 
equilibrium, however, matters look quite different. Banks are compelled by 
the withdrawal of deposits to sell off some bonds and call back some of their 
private sector loans, shifting KK down to K'K'  and RR outward to R'R'.  The 
decrease in  the  capital  stock  provokes  a  second  inward  shift of  the  ZI 
schedule, while  lower tax  revenues and  a higher real  bond  rate work  to 
reverse the favorable impact of  the wage cut on the fiscal deficit. In figure 
7.3  the  adjusted  (and  actual)  fiscal  deficit  still  declines,  but,  due  to  a 
relatively large decrease in C,  a higher inflation rate is required to collect the 
smaller  inflation tax  (ITC).  More  generally,  the  necessary  and  sufficient 
condition for IT  to increase is 
where z3 = rLxDw/Y"(l -  7);  z, = rbk@"/y"(1  -  7);  q,  is the own-price 
elasticity  of  private  sector  bond  demand  [(~%3"/'lar,)r&?"];  and  Eb  is  the 
elasticity of landowners' deposit demand with respect to rb. In light of (38), 
an  eventual  increase  in  the  inflation  rate  cannot  be  judged  unusual, 
particularly when  c!+,  is relatively small (making the RR  schedule relatively 
flat) and bonds and deposits are substitutes (E~  < 0). 
Public sector layoffs (Ng  & ) have  effects qualitatively identical to public 
sector wage cuts except insofar as it is necessary to take account of possible 
differences in the productivity of  public and private sector employment. K 
always decreases, r, always increases, and if  public sector employment is 
governed  by  the  shadow-pricing rule,  F'  = wx, (38)  again  determines 
whether IT  rises. On the other hand, when public sector employment is too 
high  initially (F' < wx),  the  inflation rate is  more  likely to  decline (the 504  Edward F.  Buffie 
budgetary  impact  is  more  favorable)  and  the  layoffs  generate  a  direct 
efficiency gain (of [wx -  F‘])  that has to be weighed against the output loss 
owing to capital decumulation. 
The last alternative is to raise the value-added tax.  This is very risky.16 
Workers reduce their currency and deposit holdings and landowners increase 
their bond purchases. The direct impact on capital accumulation and deposit 
demand of  the family firm, however, is ambiguous as a higher value for T 
lowers both the real return on capital and the time preference rate. And the 
general equilibrium outcome is yet more uncertain because it is necessary to 
make allowance for the effects of  the change in  the real bond  rate (which 
may  rise or  fall). The one result that  can be  established is:  if  the  family 
firm’s  time  preference  rate  is  relatively  inelastic  with  respect  to  real 
consumption  (q  is  small)  and  bonds  and  deposits  are  substitutes  in 
landowners’ portfolios (D3 < 0), then a higher tax rate will induce capital 
decumulation. 
While our analysis of  different fiscal policies suggests that  higher debt 
service should be countered by  reductions in real government consumption 
 expenditure^,'^ in practice it may be unrealistic to expect the entire burden 
of  adjustment to  be  borne  by  this  single  instrument,  particularly  in  the 
Mexican  case  where  the  combined  impact on  the  fiscal deficit  of  higher 
debt  service  and  lower  oil  revenues  has  been  extremely  large.  If  the 
political  will  does  not  exist  to  enforce  large-scale  cuts  in  government 
consumption,  additional  instruments will  have  to  be  used  to  extract  the 
larger trade balance surplus required to service the debt. A higher inflation 
tax,  of  course, has  been  one of  the main instruments supplementing fiscal 
adjustment.  The  Mexican  government  has  also,  however,  made  strong 
efforts  to  stem  inflationary  pressures  by  recourse  to  a  variety  of  other 
policies.  In  my  view,  all of  these  “supplementary”  policies have  slowed 
growth  by  reducing  the  incentives for  capital  accumulation and  possibly 
exacerbated inflationary  pressures over  the  medium  and  long  run.  In  the 
next  four  sections,  each  of  these  policies  is  examined  in  isolation  to 
highlight their distinctive effects. 
7.3  Higher Reserve Requirements 
The  idea  behind  imposing  high  reserve  requirements  is  to  engineer  a 
decrease in the inflation rate by  strengthening the demand for the monetary 
base.  No  doubt this policy  will  temporarily lower the inflation rate,  but it 
also provokes capital decumulation and must raise T  in the long run. When k 
is increased, the supply of bank loans contracts and the steady-state capital 
stock  declines  from  KO to  K, in  figure  7.4.  Moreover,  the  reduction  in 
government loan  revenue worsens  the  deficit  on  financial  intermediation, 
causing the XX schedule to shift rightward to X‘X’.  This is an example of 505  MexicolChapter 7 
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Fig. 7.4  The effect of a higher reserve requirement 
what Sargent and Wallace (1986) have called “some  unpleasant monetarist 
arithmetic”-ceteris  paribus, less government lending to (or more borrow- 
ing from) the private sector is ultimately inflationary. 
In  moving  to  the new  stationary equilibrium, the  inflationary problems 
arising from the larger deficit on financial intermediation are compounded by 
a higher real bond  rate that swells interest payments on the internal debt, 
lower  tax  revenues,  and  a  smaller  level  of  real  currency  holdings. 
Consequently, in the long run, a restrictive credit policy not only lowers real 
output and increases the extent of  underemployment but is also massively 
inflationary. 
What underlies the strong result that inflation invariably increases is the 
assumption that fluctuations in the deficit on financial intermediation lead to 
equivalent, endogenous swings in the overall fiscal deficit. I believe this is 
the most realistic representation of  the fiscal process in Mexico; it may be 
argued, however, that the expenditure variable the government manipulates 
is total spending net of subsidies to cover losses of the banking system. That 
is, in the government budget constraint (27),  perhaps one ought to combine 
G and Z into the single policy-controlled variable G*. 
Under this specification of the fiscal process, a higher reserve requirement 
exerts no direct, adverse effect upon the budget since other expenditure cuts 
fully offset the larger deficit on financial intermediation. Nonetheless, the 
policy may still fail. It can be demonstrated that when bonds and deposits are 
substitutes, the lower capital stock and higher real bond rate may well cause 
the real monetary base to decline instead of  increase.18 This possibility is 
illustrated in figure 7.5. 
Even when a higher reserve ratio succeeds in  strengthening the demand 
for the monetary base, however, there is no guarantee that the inflation rate 506  Edward F.  Buffie 
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Fig. 7.5  The effect of a higher reserve requirement when losses of the 
banking system are offset by  cuts in  government consumption 
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will fall. Lower tax revenues and higher interest payments on the internal 
debt may  raise the  fiscal deficit by  an  amount exceeding the  increase in 
revenue from the inflation tax. For the inflation rate to end up higher in the 
new steady state, it is necessary only that 
(39)  + kbEp){TrL(1 -  +er)/e,"(i  -  7) 
- ~[i  - p,(i -  +)ep-Lc/e,"Yw(l  -  T)]} + [CYJPT(~  -  kb) 
+ mb1pd(1  -+)e,mr,ow/e,mYw(i  -  T)  > 0. 
The first term is likely to be negative when IT  is moderately high (note that 
f!  + hy  > 0  implies  B"ab + k,e,D"  > O),  but  could  easily  be  over- 
whelmed by  the second positive term. 
7.4  Enforced Bank Purchases of Government Bonds 
The high  interest rates paid  on  short-term treasury notes (CETES) and 
other  types  of  government  paper  have  become  a  major  policy  issue  in 
Mexico. It is widely felt that the high rates have acted as a strong deterrent to 
private sector investment and been an important factor fueling growth of the 
fiscal deficit.''  In recent years, the Mexican government has attempted to 
bring down interest rates by requiring commercial banks to reserve a larger 
fraction of their total investible funds for the purchase of various government 
financial instruments (principally CETES). 
This heavy-handed policy  can easily backfire for the same reason  that 
higher reserve requirements may be counterproductive. Diverting bank credit 
from the private to the public sector shifts the RR schedule to the right in 
figure 7.6 but also lowers the steady-state capital stock: 507  Mexico/Chapter I 
Fig. 7.6  The effect of an increase in mandatory bank purchases of 
government bonds 
_-  dK - -f]DVf + hl(l - k)]/e,  < 0. 
dkb  (40) 
Capital decumulation moves the economy southwest along R'R',  but stops 
short of the point where rb rises: 
In view of  the drop in tax revenues and the erosion of  the real monetary 
base which accompany capital decumulation, there is no general expectation 
that the inflation rate will decrease in the long run. For simplicity, suppose 
rb = r, initially. In this case, n  increases if 
A wide set of plausible parameter values satisfy (42).  In fact, when bonds and 
deposits are complements (Eb > o),  there is, if  anything, a presumption that 
IT  will increase. Figure 7.6 portrays the outcome in the special case where 
lower interest payments on the internal debt, lower tax revenues, and lower 508  Edward F.  Buffie 
deposit holdings cancel out, leaving the adjusted fiscal deficit unchanged. The 
inflation rate then rises because the same amount of revenue from the currency 
inflation tax must be extracted from a smaller stock of currency holdings. 
7.5  Bond Financing of the Deficit 
Reduced monetization of  the fiscal deficit has been an important element 
in the anti-inflation program of  the De La Madrid administration. Between 
1982 and  1986,  the  real  stock  of  high-powered  money  decreased  33.6 
percent  while real  bond  sales (CETES and  petrobonds) from  the  federal 
government to the nonbank private sector rose 25.6 percent.20 
Whether it  is wise  to  substitute bond  for money financing of  the fiscal 
deficit depends largely on whether bonds and deposits are complements or 
substitutes in private sector portfolios. In the borderline case where deposit 
demand is  independent of  the  real bond  rate,  T increases but  neither the 
capital stock nor real output changes. This is another instance of Sargent and 
Wallace’s  “unpleasant  monetarist  arithmetic.”  Bond  sales  tend  to  be 
inflationary since they increase interest payments on the internal debt. 
When bonds and deposits are substitutes, the adverse macroeconomic effects 
are much more serious. Figure 7.7 shows what goes wrong. The bond sale forces 
up r,, inducing substitution out of deposits, a reduction in bank loans, and capital 
decumulation. Real output falls and the inflation rate increases strongly as  higher 
interest payments and lower tax revenues enlarge the fiscal deficit at the same 
time that the demand for the monetary base contracts. 
Finally, if the two assets turn out to be complements instead of  substitutes, 
a case can be  made  for greater bond  financing  of  the deficit.  With  asset 
complementarity, a higher real bond rate eventually elicits a higher level of 
lr ‘  ‘I‘ 
Fig. 7.7  The effect of  a bond sale 509  Mexicotchapter I 
real  bank  deposits  and  financial  deepening.  Hence,  the  capital  stock 
increases and the inflation rate may possibly decline. 
7.6  Cutbacks in Public Sector Infrastructure Investment 
It  was  stressed  earlier  that  reductions  in  government  consumption 
spending are the best means of  minimizing the adverse long-run effects of 
debt service. Though the Mexican  government has  made strong efforts in 
this direction, the reductions in public sector investment spending have been 
even more severe. Few  objections can be made against retrenchment in the 
inefficient parastatal sector, but  the  deep cutbacks in  social infrastructure 
investment are troublesome. Like so many of  the other post-1982 policies, 
this latter policy  seems very  shortsighted; it eases inflationary pressures in 
the  short run  to  the  detriment of  the macroeconomic tradeoffs facing the 
economy over the medium and long run. 
The model is easily modified to incorporate infrastructure capital that  is 
complementary with private capital. Interpret S now as social infrastructure 
investment. Since net investment is zero in steady-state equilibrium, S  = 6J 
in (33), where 6 is the depreciation rate and J  is the stock of  infrastructure 
capital.  Also,  in  keeping  with  the  notion  that  the  primary  role  of 
infrastructure capital is to promote private investment, assume 
An increase in J raises the marginal productivity of private sector capital but 
does not directly affect output ($J  = 0) or labor demand (&,J  = O).21 
It  can  be  confirmed  from  (9) and  (10) that  if  either  (i)  an  exogenous 
increase in time preference induces capital decumulation or (ii) r, 6 0, then 
a decrease in J  lowers the steady-state capital stock. Assuming that one of 
these  two  weak,  sufficient  conditions holds,  the  cutback  in  spending on 
infrastructure investment shifts XX to X'X'  and KK to K'K' in figure 7.8.22 
In  what must be a by  now familiar refrain, capital decumulation drives the 
economy to a new steady state in which real output and the monetary base 
are lower and the real bond rate is higher. 
With K  lower and rb higher, the inflation rate may rise either because the 
demand  for  the  monetary  base  contracts  or  because  the  fiscal  deficit 
increases. It is particularly relevant that an increase in IT  can occur when the 
elasticity of  K  with  respect to  J  is extremely  small.  For  example,  when 
deposit demand is independent of  rb (D3 = 0), the necessary and sufficient 
condition for IT  to increase is 
where A = (df'/d.l)J/K,  the elasticity of  K  with respect to J. The bracketed 510  Edward F.  Buffie 
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Fig. 7.8  The effect of a reduction in the stock of social infrastructure capital 
term  multiplying  A will  usually  be  less  than  one-half  (unless  (Yb < z4), 
but on the right side SJ/Q"  is an exceedingly small term, the "cost  share" 
of  public  infrastructure  depreciation  allowances  in  manufacturing  pro- 
duction. An  increase in T is quite conceivable for values of  A  on the order 
of 0.10. 
7.7  Import Compression 
Finally, to round out  the  analysis of import compression in  chapter 6, 
consider  the  repercussions  of  tighter  import  quotas.  When  machinery 
imports are restricted, the real supply price of  capital rises. If  the implicit 
tariff is  initially zero, there is no direct impact upon income of  the family 
firm (up to a first-order effect) and the imposition of the quota affects K, rb, 
and  M  much  like a  reduction  in  public  sector  infrastructure  investment, 
except  inflation  always  rises  since  there  is  no  decrease  in  government 
expenditures. 
A  similar  analysis applies to  tighter quotas on  imported  intermediate 
inputs. On the usual assumption for factors are gross complements, import 
compression lowers the marginal productivity of both capital and labor. The 
contractionary  supply-side  effects  are  thus  equivalent  to  a  cutback  in 
infrastructure  investment  combined  with  a  direct,  employment-reducing 
shock in the high-wage manufacturing sector. 
7.8  Conclusions 
Since  1982 Mexico has  been  burdened by  a  massive  increase in  debt 
service and adverse terms of  trade. In this chapter I have examined a large 511  Mexico/Chapter 7 
number of different policy measures that could plausibly be used in adjusting 
to such shocks. My very pessimistic conclusion is that only sufficiently large 
cuts in government consumption expenditure will prevent the economy from 
descending into a severe stagflationary spiral. 
The De La Madrid administration  has not been able to institute the requisite 
expenditure cuts. In making this observation it is not my  intent to belittle 
recent efforts at fiscal reform: the cutbacks in public sector absorption have 
been sizable but insufficient given the sheer magnitude of the deterioration in 
external conditions. But if adverse external conditions made it inevitable that 
stagflation would continue for a period after the 1982 debacle, it also seems 
that  the  stabilization program  adopted  by  the  administration to  contain 
inflation was ill-conceived and has made the crisis deeper and more prolonged 
than  necessary. A  series of  devastating blows  have  been  dealt to private 
investment by imposing high reserve ratios, requiring banks to allocate a large 
share of their portfolio to the purchase of various government-issued assets, 
financing a greater part of the fiscal deficit through bond sales, cutting public 
sector employment and  wages, and reducing expenditures to augment the 
stock  of  infrastructure capital.  Furthermore,  beyond  the  short run,  such 
austerity policies are unlikely to bring much relief on the price front and may 
well make it more difficult to control inflation. Once lower investment takes 
its toll on the capital stock, real bond rates start rising, the demand for the 
monetary base weakens, and tax revenues grow more slowly, all of  which 
reignite inflationary pressures.23 
Unfortunately, it does not follow from these heterodox results that the cure 
for the current crisis is to  lower reserve requirements and increase public 
sector wages, social infrastructure investment, and  the growth rate of  the 
money  supply. Comparative steady-state analysis neglects difficulties that 
may arise from a deteriorating payments balance during the transition path. 
Obviously, all the  aforementioned policies  would  increase absorption and 
thereby  worsen  the  current  account  deficit  over  the  “short  run.”  Such 
policies  are  simply  not  feasible  if  initially the  government’s  supply  of 
foreign exchange reserves is uncomfortably low and the country lacks access 
to  additional foreign  borrowing.  When  due consideration is  given  to  the 
foreign exchange bottleneck, one is much less inclined to be harshly critical 
of  the De La Madrid administration’s policies. If  sociopolitical factors do in 
fact limit the extent to which public sector consumption can be cut, the real 
message of the analysis is that the arduous task of servicing the foreign debt 
has forced Mexico to adopt a set of  austerity measures that promise only 
deepening stagflation for the foreseeable future. 
Appendix 
In this appendix, I specify the intertemporal optimization problem solved 
by  each agent and then derive the agent’s asset demands. All variables are 512  Edward F. Buffie 
expressed  in  real  terms  and  agents'  consumption  expenditure  and  asset 
demands are distinguished by  c, v, and w superscripts. For notational ease, 
superscripts are omitted for all other variables. 
The Family Firm 
Current utility, u, is represented by the indirect utility function, V(E', D'), 
where E"  is real consumption expenditure and D'  is real deposit holdings. 
Total  real  financial  wealth  of  the family firm  is A = D" -  Lo, where Lo 
denotes real loan demand. The firm can borrow a maximum of L from the 
commercial banks and uses the loan proceeds and retained profits to finance 
additional accumulation of  real  deposits and physical capital. With  Uzawa 
preferences, the optimization problem solved by  the family firm is thus 
K=I 
(A41  A  = Sf 
645)  D-ASL, 
where K  is the capital stock; p(u) is the variable time preference rate; I  is 
investment; S,  is financial savings; r,  and r,  are the real deposit and real loan 
rates; and an overdot denotes a time derivative. 
Equation  (A2)  is  the  family  firm's  budget  constraint.  Current  period 
profits  are  determined by  the  restricted  profit  function,  +(K)  (where the 
constant  real  wage  wm  is  suppressed).  Capital  does  not  depreciate  and 
technology exhibits constant returns to scale so that +KK  = 0. 
The next two equations specify the laws of motion for the capital stock and 
the stock of  financial wealth, while (A5) represents the borrowing constraint. 
There are also nonnegativity constraints (not stated) on D" and Lo. 
After substituting for E in the indirect utility function and transforming 
the time  variable as in  Uzawa  (I  968), we  have the following Lagrangean 
associated with the problem (Al)-(A5): 
e-P  (A6)  Max  = -{V[+(K)(l  -  T)  + rdDc -  rL(Dc -  A) 
{D', I,  S'}  P(u) 
-  I -  Sf,  0'3  + XI1 + A&  + h,(L  + A -  D')}, 
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and the  Xi are multipliers appended to the constraints (A3)-(A5). 
In this control problem, there is a mixed inequality constraint involving 
both  a  control  variable  and  a  state variable  ([A5]),  and  one  of  the  state 
variables  (A)  can jump whenever the borrowing constraint  is not binding. 
This makes for generally  complicated first-order conditions.  However, our 
main  interest  lies  in  steady-state  comparisons  in  which  L  is  fixed.  For 
simplicity, I assume, therefore,  that (A5) is continuously binding.  (This is 
the case when vE[rd - rL] +  V, > 0.) Optimality then requires 
i2  = A2 -  p-'[A,  + VErLp(l - p'F/p)], 
where 
F  V(*)  + AJ  + A2S'  + A,(L  + A -  D') 
and a  O  over a variable denotes  a derivative with respect  to  P. (The time 
variable has been eliminated through theo transionnation dt = dp/p.) 
Across steady states where Z = 5''  = A,  = A,  = 0, (A9) and (A10) yield 
and (A7), (AS), and (All) imply 
where E = +(K)(l -  7)  + rdDc -  rLL. These are equations (1 1) and (12) 
in the text, which may be solved for K and D'  as a function of rd, r, ,  L, and 7. 
Landowners 
Landowners  hold  two  stores  of  wealth,  deposits,  D", and  bonds,  B". 
Employing the same notation as in the previous section, their optimization 
problem may be stated as 514  Edward F.  Buffie 
subject to 
(A14)  E" = v(l -  T) + rdDv + rb(A - D")  - Sf 
(A13  A  =Sf, 
where now A = D"  + B". 
The solution to  (A13) yields the conditions that in a steady state 
where E" = v(l -  T) + r, B" + rdD".  From (A16) and (A17), we obtain 
the steady-state solutions for B'  and D": 
(A181  B"  = f2[rb,  rd,  v(l -  T)] 
where 
From  the expressions  for the f, and  hi, some  useful  restrictions on  the 
relative magnitudes of  own-  and  cross-price effects  can  be  derived.  Note 
that 
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and 
(f:% -  f22h';)  sign of  (1 -  rlYL 
where  q = b/k, the  elasticity  of  p  with  respect  to  real  consumption 
expenditure  (a  circumflex denotes  the  percentage  change  in  a  variable); 
q = rbBv/E", the  share  of  real  interest  income  from  bonds  in  total  real 
income;  and  y = r&E",  the  share  of  real  asset  "income"  in  total  in- 
come (when the dollar value of  its nonpecuniary benefits is included, the 
real  return  on  deposits  equals  rb). The  above  results  follow  under  the 
restriction that  p is strictly concave in C  (implying q < 1) and the weak, 
realistic  assumption  that  income  from  land  rents  is  large  enough  that 
y,q < 1. 
The normal result that f: > 0 requires 
(A20)  p'virb - (l -  qq)[VDD -  vED(rb  -  rd)l 
-  Jo[q(l + r,)q - I] > 0. 
The first two terms are positive as is the third under the very weak restriction 
that qq < (1 + rb)-l. 
Workers 
not purchase bonds. They solve the optimization problem: 
Workers hold both types of  money, deposits, D",  and currency, C,  but do 
(A231  A  = Sj, 
where A = D"  + C;  Y"  denotes  total  wage  income; and T is the  infla- 
tion rate.  The indirect utility function V(-) exhibits the following charac- 
teristics: 
VE, VD, Vc,  VED, VEc > 0;  VcD, v.1~9  Vcc,  VDD < 0; 
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The  negative  sign  for  V,,  reflects  the  notion  that  the  two  assets  are 
substitutes as mediums of exchange. 
Optimizing behavior requires that in a stationary equilibrium the marginal 
rate of  substitution between deposits  and  goods equals the time preference 
rate less the deposit rate: 
and  that  the  marginal  nonpecuniary  benefits  of  currency  exceed  those  of 
deposits  by  an amount equalling  the nominal deposit  rate  (the opportunity 
cost of currency): 
where 
Ew = Yw(l -  T)  + r,D"  - TC 
<(Ow,  c)  = VC - VD. 
The  omission  of  E"  from  5(*) reflects  the  simplifying  assumption  that 
V,,  = V,,  (changes  in  real  consumption  expenditure  do not  affect  the 
relative marginal nonpecuniary benefits of deposits and currency).  From the 
properties of  the utility function,  it is seen that &,  > 0 and cc < 0. 
The representative worker's  asset demands are not as well defined as those 
of family firms and landowners because p is not pinned down by the rate of 
return  on some asset (rb for landowners and  +K[l  -  T]  for capitalists).  To 
ensure sensible asset demands, I assume 
(A26) 
('427) 
bo = V,,(p  - rd) - V,,  + Vip' < 0 
rdbo < VDD  - VED(P -  rd) - VEVDP' 
y <  EW/(rd  + T)D", 
where  y = -V,,E"/V,,  the  "partial"  Arrow-Pratt  measure  of  risk  aver- 
sion (i.e., y is defined for given values of D"  and C). The effect of an in- 
crease in  Y"  on the incentive to accumulate  deposits is given by  the sign 
of  -bo.  I assume  the  time  preference  rate  does not  increase  too  strongly 
(p'  is relatively  small) so that  a higher  Y"  tends  to raise D".  The second 
restriction guarantees that the marginal benefits of holding deposits decline 
relative to the  opportunity  cost of  deposits  as D" increases.  This  requires 
that  the  positive  income  effect  associated  with  greater  deposit  holdings, 
rA0,  not be  too large.  And  finally,  the condition  stated  in  (A28) requires 
that y not exceed the reciprocal of  the share of  nominal interest income  in 
workers'  total real  income  (which  equals E"  in  a  steady  state).  Since the 517  MexicoKhapter 8 
latter is a very  large number, this restriction will be  satisfied for realistic 
values of  y. 
Given the restrictions in (A26)-(A28),  it is easy to establish that the asset 
demands 
Casual observation and numerous empirical studies suggest that deposits are 
a normal, not an inferior, asset. Accordingly, I assume that the first positive 
term dominates the second negative term in (A31). 
8  Debt Management 
and Negotiations 
The Mexican debt began to grow rapidly in  1973 and is marked by  three 
distinct phases. Table 8.1 presents a partial decomposition of the increase in 
the debt. What is striking in the decomposition is the fact that the net resource 
transfer accompanying the debt buildup has never been large. The resource 
transfer  was  greatest  during  the  Echevem'a  administration,  but  due  to 
large-scale capital flight in 1975 and 1976, the cumulative noninterest current 
account deficit totalled less  than  half  of  the  increase in  the  debt.  In  the 
subsequent  Lopez  Portillo  administration,  the  net  resource  transfer  was 
negligible.  Almost  all  new  borrowing  served to  finance  capital  flight or 
interest payments on previously contracted debt; the cumulative noninterest 
current account deficit accounted for only 5 percent of the debt accumulated 
between  1977 and  1982. After  1982 the  direction of  resource flows was 
reversed and Mexico made large net  transfers abroad.  The De  La Madrid 
administration ran the huge trade balance surpluses required to make interest 
payments on the debt. Unsettlingly, however, the current account registered a 
cumulative surplus of $9.6 billion from 1983 to 1986, even as the total debt 